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1.  Introduction  
 
                  The experience of countries adjusting in the wake of the global crisis of 
1997-2000 has awakened many debates related to the political economy and social costs 
of adjustment. Amongst these, the experience of Russia is particularly controversial, 
both because of the great severity of the shock experienced by a large number of 
Russians during the process of perestroika, and because of the political consequences, 
which in many provinces have involved street protests and demonstrations and in some, 
also violence and demands for secession (Giuliano 2006). These political consequences 
are relevant to the general question of the political feasibility of adjustment in the 
circumstances of the present decade, which is examined in several papers within our 
research project (e.g. Mosley 2007a, 2007b). 
                In this paper, we examine within this context political participation and wage 
inequality during the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. We use two household survey data 
sets. The VTsIOM household survey dataset, conducted in 1998 and 1999, was used to 
analyze individuals’ response patters to escalating economic hardship. Data from the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) was employed in our analysis of the 
welfare impacts of the crisis.  
 
  We address two key questions. Firstly, we attempt to identify major factors 
behind individuals’ propensity to take part in a political protest. In particular, we look at 
what determines individual support for reform and whether individual propensities 
change with the targeted audience. Secondly, we attempt to determine who are the 
winners and losers from the crisis, in the spirit of the earlier analysis of Brainerd(1998). 
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In particular, we analyse whether wage inequality widened during the crisis and whether 
wage discrimination worsened. These questions are of interest for several reasons. 
Firstly, the pace and extent of the crisis had a dramatic impact on Russia’s economy 
which, in turn, may have influenced political mobilization motivated by claims for 
policy reversals. Secondly, if financial crisis generated wage inequality, it is important 
to identify the extent, pattern, and nature of the wage inequality for effective policy 
formulation.  
 
  The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we examine the economic 
crisis. In the next section, we introduce the data set and variables used for the analysis. 
Section 4 presents our methodology and Section 5 provides the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.      
 
 
2. Background  
                Following failed attempts aimed at steering Russia away from the economic 
crisis which involved dismissal of the Cabinet and $22 billion assistance package from 
the IMF, on 17 August 1998, the Russian Government was forced to default on its 
private domestic debt, devalue the rouble, and announce a 90-day moratorium on 
foreign debt repayment. Two major exogenous factors induced these drastic measures. 
Firstly, the Asian financial crisis which started in April 1997 and hit Russia in the 
following year. Secondly, the sharp fall in oil prices by nearly 40% (from $23 per barrel 
in mid-1997 to $11 per barrel in mid-1998), with a parallel drop in prices of non-ferrous 
metals by between 20% and 40%, contributed to a decline in revenue from Russia’s 
main export staples, and thence to the economic downturn.  
 
  4  5
  The August default was preceded by major setbacks on the home front. By the 
end of 1996, with output falling by 42% since 1991, Russia’s federal budget deficit had 
risen to nearly 8% of GDP and federal tax revenues had fallen from  28.4% of the GDP 
to 23.7% in 1997 (Lopez-Claros and Alexashenko, 1998; Desai, 2000). The 
conditionality attached to the associated IMF standby operation, aimed at reducing 
inflationary pressure, forbade borrowing from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and 
provided loans which ensured the fixed exchange rate regime. To finance the increasing 
budget deficit, the Russian Government turned in May 1993 to short-term treasury bills. 
The gross issues of the Russian treasury bills (GKO), consisting of very short-term 
maturities (1-3 months), increased significantly in 1996. The GKO market boomed, 
with yields averaging around 40% in 1996-97. The policy of exchange rate stability, 
which led to an overvalued rouble, together with the partial removal of restrictions on 
foreign capital flows, attracted foreign investors, as well as domestic investors who 
were borrowing abroad to invest in the GKO market. In mid-1997 to mid-1998, falling 
commodity prices hit Russia’s balance of payments and, in turn, contributed to the fall 
in the GKO market. As the CBR continued to support the rouble, the first $4.6bn 
tranche of the 1998 IMF assistance package which came in July in support of the fixed 
exchange rate disappeared in two weeks (Desai, 2000).  The inability of the government 
(Russian commercial banks) to redeem the foreign share of the GKO-OKZ securities 
(private foreign debt) which accounted to $6bn ($16bn) become evident and the Russian 
Government opted for an outright default (Desai, 2000). As a result, the rouble 
depreciated from 6 per $US in August 1998 to 21 in December 1998.  
 
  By 1998, Russia’s output had fallen by 45 per cent in relation to the start of 
perestroika in 1990?, while unemployment had risen to 13.2 percent, its highest post- 
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transition level, with youth (aged 15-24) unemployment levels reaching 26.8 percent 
(UNICEF, 2005). The crisis imposed an additional shock on to an already declining 
economy, with average household income falling by 20 percent in real terms,  the share 
of wages in total income falling from 41 percent to 36 percent in relation to 1996 data 
(Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000), and dramatic deteriorations in health and mortality rates 
through the decade (Brainerd 2001, Stillman 2005). The 1998 crisis led to a rise in the 
incidence of wage arrears, which, as our subsequent analysis suggests, may partly be 
responsible for the rising wage inequality. Lehman, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1999) 
show that around 65 percent of the workers were owed money at the height of the 
problem in November 1998. Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) argue that wage inequality was 
a major driver of overall inequality, with the Gini index for monthly wages rising to 
around 0.46 in 1998 (Figure 4).  Following the crisis, the gender pay gap widened, with 
the substantial part of the wage gap explained by discrimination. Gerry, Kim and Li 
(2004) show that 18-34 year old women experienced the largest discrimination 
following the 1998 crisis. Welfare indicators from the RLMS show that the poverty rate 
increased from 22 percent in 1996 to 33 percent in 1998 (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000).  
 
  With growing wage arrears and fading confidence in Russia’s financial stability 
as the Asian crisis peaked in October 1997, investors pulled back from the GKO 
market.  The CBR was unable to halt the outflow of capital, which reached $1.8bn in 
January 1998 (Buchs, 1999). In light of the Government’s failure to keep the promise it 
made to clear public sector wage arrears by the end of 1997, public protests and strikes 
escalated in the first quarter of 1998 which eventually led to the dismissal of Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin for failure to solve the wages problem.  
 
  6  7
  In sum, deficit financing through the medium of the GKOs, combined with the 
East-Asian crises and a fall in the commodity price was one of the main apparent causes 
of the crisis. Yet inherent state of economy and political system was susceptible to the 
external factors (Perotti, 2002). Asset dollarization, weak fiscal discipline, capital flight, 
state capture (heightened following 1996 Presidential elections), dubious supervision 
policy of Russia’s commercial banks, and IMF supported exchange rate regime which 
led to overvalued rouble played a significant role. 
 
3. Data  
In the first part of the analysis we use the VTsIOM data set. The survey for the 
data was conducted by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (or VTsIOM, its 
Russian acronym) in January 1998, May 1998, September 1998, January 1999, May 
1999, September 1999 and January 2000. The survey covers around 2,500 individuals. 
Interviews were conducted in all of the country’s 11 major economic-geographical 
regions, plus Moscow city. The sample survey was randomly selected, based on   
multistage stratified sampling. This ensured that each individual had an equal 
opportunity of being selected. Some of the territorial-administrative regions in the South 
Caucusus (due to the military conflict) and in the Far North (due to remoteness) were 
excluded.   
 
  Data were collected, among other things, on a range of basic demographic, 
health and education indicators, labour market behaviour and outcomes, voting 
behaviour, attitudes toward reform and willingness to participate in political protest.  
We do not have information on the actual number of years of schooling. Education is 
coded by respondent’s completed years of schooling. The dependent variable used in 
the earnings equations is the log of monthly cash earnings received from the main job. 
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The VTsIOM survey does not ask questions about hours worked. It is important to note 
that the use of the monthly wage variable may be problematic since it may be distorted 
due to possible differences in the average hours of work of male and female workers.  
  
  In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the VTsIOM sample. To focus on 
working age adults, we exclude students, children who are less than 16 years of age, 
disabled and pensioners. In addition, there are some respondents who did not report 
their wage, education, or household composition. These observations are also excluded 
from the analysis. Our empirical analysis of earnings is restricted to the sample of 
individuals whose wage was positive at the time of the survey.  
 
  The second data source is Rounds 8 and 9 of the RLMS, conducted in the 
autumn of 1998 and 2000. The RLMS is a nationally representative longitudinal panel 
of around 4,000 households. We focus on individuals who completed the adult 
questionnaire and use the cross-sectional feature of the data. Thus we exclude 
individuals who moved from the original sample. Our final sample consists of 7,894 
individuals in Round 8 and 7,568 individuals in Round 9.  
 
  To focus on working age adults, we exclude students, children who are less than 
16 years of age, disabled and pensioners. In addition, there are some respondents who 
did not report their wage, education, or household composition information. These 
observations are also excluded from the analysis. Our empirical analysis of earnings is 
restricted to the sample of individuals whose wage was positive at the time of the 
survey. The sample retained includes around 4,000 individuals between the ages of 16 
(the school-leaving age) and 60 (55) in the case of men (women), who also report a 
wage from the main job (60 is the state retirement age for men and 55 is for women). 
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The dependent variable used in the earnings equations is the log of hourly monthly 
wages received from the main job net of payroll and income taxes.  
 
4. The Model 
             We assume that an individual ‘s choice of whether to be politically active is 
dependent on an economically rational comparison of the expected utility from the two 
possible outcomes, which can be viewed as the decision to become involved in political 
action protesting against the government (g = 1) and non-participation in such action (g 
= 0). The separate utilities (U) for the two outcomes are approximated as:  
 





0 0 0 0 u X U + + = β α  for g=0  
 
where ά and β are the parameters to be estimated;   is a set of explanatory variables 
which influence utility; ( ) are independently distributed with mean zero and 
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where F(·) is the operator for the CDF; the parameter, ά, indicates the utility level 
attached to the state when g=1 relative to g=0; the parameter, β,  represents the effect of 
the covariate on the utility.  
 
  Following McFadden (1974), if the error terms in (1) are assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed, their difference (between different outcomes) 
follows a logistic distribution, so that  F(·) in  (2) can be expressed as the CDF for the 
logistic function Φ(·). Thus, a  logit model is applied to obtain the log odds ratios in our 
analysis of utility- maximizing behaviour.     
 
  Before we proceed to estimating the wage inequality, we assume that individual 
earnings are determined subject to the following specification: 
 
i i i X Y ε β + = ln                                                                                           (3) 
where   is the natural logarithm of the observed wage for individual i,   is a vector 
of observed characteristics which includes an expanded set of explanatory variables and 
i Y ln i X
β  is the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
 
  Eq. (3) is estimated using an OLS regression. The specification of the earnings 
equation is a simple human capital model with a basic set of regressors which includes 
conventional human capital characteristics, personal characteristics, occupational 




5. Empirical Evidence 
Poverty and Wage Inequality  
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Table 1 suggests that the initial dispersion at the top of the wage distribution was similar 
for both genders. However, there was a significant rise in the overall wage distribution 
in May 1998. For men, the 90th to 10th decile ratio increased significantly to 3.46 log 
points and further to 3.75 log points in January 1999. For women, the dispersion in the 
top half of the distribution rose from 3.261 but then fell to 1.47 log points in January 
2000. The 90
th- to- the- median ratio remained essentially unchanged. For men, the 
dispersion at the bottom of the tail narrowed. For women, the dispersion narrowed but 
then rose to 0.79 log points. In sum, the right tail of the distribution significantly 
thickened for men and women immediately after the crisis. Changes in the returns to 
human capital may partly explain the increase in inequality. If returns to human capital 
were affected by the crisis, we should expect to see a  widening of the wage distribution 
if the highly skilled have gained whereas the less skilled have lost. In addition, these 
findings may be explained by imperfect wage indexation.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of the Log Wage, Jan 98 through Jan 1999 
  Jan 98  May 98  Sep 98  Jan 99  May 99  Sep 99  Jan99 
Men         
90-10  1.372 3.459 3.459 3.459 3.644 3.644 3.751 
90-50  1.133 1.154 1.188 1.117 1.159 1.159 1.193 
50-10  0.826 0.334 0.343 0.323 0.318 0.318 0.318 
Variance  0.646 4.394 5.092 3.750 3.077 3.900 3.418 
Women         
90-10  1.353 3.263 3.263 3.358 3.372 3.459 1.477 
90-50  1.121 1.154 1.197 1.176 1.131 1.163 1.170 
50-10  0.828 0.354 0.367 0.350 0.335 0.336 0.793 
Variance  0.589 3.064 4.089 2.638 2.321 2.717 2.177 
All         
90-10  1.377 3.358 3.411 3.459 3.459 3.561 3.644 
90-50  1.148 1.153 1.223 1.174 1.137 1.150 1.159 
50-10  0.834 0.343 0.358 0.339 0.329 0.323 0.318 
Variance  0.679 3.611 4.507 3.142 2.654 3.245 2.742 
Source: Own estimations based on  VTsIOM data.  
            
  Lorenz curves representing the distribution of income between January 1998 and 
January 2000 are presented in Figure 1. They show that income inequality has risen, and 
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that the curve for September 1998 was the furthest from the line of equality, as 
compared to the curves for May 1999 and September 1999: in other words that there 
was a sharp increase in income in equality in the immediate post-crisis period, followed 
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Figure 3. The Lorenz Curves
 
  The percentage of the population below the standard Russian low-income 
threshold (60 percent of the median income) showed dramatic changes. The proportion 
of people below this low-income threshold grew by 11 percent between January and 
September 1998. Data from January 2000 shows that there was a 10% decline in the 
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Participation in political protests 
In Table 2, we present our estimates of  participation in political protest actions for the 
period January to May 1998, just before the crisis. The MNL model allows us to 
determine whether explanatory variables determine the likelihood that a given outcome 
will occur. Columns 1-3 of Table 2 are the marginal relations, typically referred to as 
"marginal effects,"  given by the partial derivative of the probability of the outcome 
occurring with respect to the explanatory variable. The marginal effects indicate the 
percentage point changes in the probability of full participation attributable to a unit 
change in each independent variable as calculated with all other independent variables 
at their sample means. The MNL models for the protest analyses are trinomial, in that 
only three outcomes are possible (e.g., the individual will participate, not participate, 
and uncertain).  
 
  Column 1 shows that  participation in protest action is: 
-  reduced by marriage, by age and by education (the younger, the unmarried and 
the less educated  are more likely to participate in a protest). 
  13  14
-  decreased by a prior decision to vote for Yeltsin in 1996 (in other words, those 
whose votes were reformist were less likely to engage in protest actions) 
-  increased by a high level of wage arrears, incorporating the personal bitterness 
of those who had not been paid; 
-  Strongly correlated with those with strong fears of future inflation,  suggesting 
that protest is heavily associated with pessimism about future economic 
prospects. 
 
In addition, individuals living in the regions outside Moscow show a higher 
propensity to participate in political action against  local governments but a smaller 
likelihood of protest action against the president and the federal government. This 
may be related to their perception of the relative risks associated with different 
behaviours. 
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Table 2. Marginal Effects of Protest Participation Decisions (Jan98-May98) 
Dependent Variable:  LOCAL PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT
Age -0.0023115***  0.0007426  -0.0007499 
Married -0.0498023**  -0.0778002**  -0.0762147*** 
North-Western 0.1740956***  0.0619314  0.0504222 
Central 0.2211768***  0.000688  -0.0005778 
Volga 0.0982122**  0.0360389  0.0214354 
Black Earth  0.1086295**  0.1058264**  0.0473834 
Povolzhskiy 0.0581564  -0.0366064  -0.0013264 
North Caucasus  0.0924265**  0.1353635***  0.068773* 
Ural 0.1650153***  0.0481307  -0.062385**1 
West Siberia  0.1282425***  0.1412241***  0.0791122** 
East Siberia  0.2695659***  0.1346907***  0.1003041** 
Far East  0.2950344***  0.1440298***  0.0967296** 
Voted Yeltsin  -0.0671998***  -0.3110281***  -0.2130521*** 
Public Sector  0.0234965  0.0039667  0.0052319 
Male 0.0201288  0.0427011**  0.0483424*** 
Years of Schooling  -0.0077959***  -0.0053348  -0.0071521 
Managerial Job  -0.016096  0.0136038  -0.0027049 
Arrears 0.0901917***  0.1715025***  0.0737011*** 
Expected Inflation  0.0996641***  0.1248748***  0.1357525*** 
Dependent Ratio  -0.0107441  0.0069531  0.000774 
Improved Status  -0.056136***  -0.1224278***  -0.1322447*** 
N   3,135 
 
  The analysis of Table 3,  which applies the same analysis to the post-crisis 
period September 1998 – May 1999 (after a sharp increase in inequality, as our earlier 
analysis showed) discovers a similar pattern of results, but with two interesting 
novelties: managerial status, which is insignificant in 1998, becomes negatively 
associated with protest in 1999 (post-crisis, managers appeared to have  more fear of 
political involvement) and improved status, which is significant in 1998, becomes 
insignificant in 1999. 
  15  16
 
Table 3. Marginal Effects of Protest Participation Decisions (Sep98-May99) 
Dependant Variable:  LOCAL  PRESIDENT  GOVERNMENT 
Age -0.0016406***  -0.0001049  -0.0031179*** 
Married -0.0452842**  0.0161996  -0.0342688 
North-Western 0.4008417***  0.1155422***  0.0345371 
Central 0.2456677***  0.0474512*  0.0003927 
Volga 0.1151917**  0.1196945***  0.1013207** 
Black Earth  0.3328971***  0.0812109**  0.0729365 
Povolzhskiy 0.2353181***  0.0556575*  0.0444467 
North Caucasus  0.1370633***  0.0945209***  0.0508271 
Ural 0.2283733***  0.0589728*  0.0451912 
West Siberia  0.3256738***  0.092494***  0.1577768*** 
East Siberia  0.4135337***  0.172617***  0.1762922*** 
Far East  0.4751094***  0.2207497***  0.2811258*** 
Voted Yeltsin  -0.0684409***  -0.1791069***  -0.0906516*** 
Public Sector  -0.0149953  0.0358737  -0.0039197 
Male 0.024366  0.0290456*  -0.0030436 
Years of Schooling  -0.0026973  -0.0050424  -0.0094166*** 
Managerial Job  -0.0449865**  -0.0298281  -0.0289071 
Arrears 0.0692185***  0.0791331***  0.0712413*** 
Expected Inflation  0.0579498***  0.1155863***  0.0637164*** 
Dependent Ratio  -0.0207692  -0.081657**  -0.0086913 
Improved Status  0.0094908  0.0318046  -0.0109922 




  All these effects persist forward into 2000 (Table 4) with the exception that 
improved status becomes negatively significant again. The general pattern is one of 
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Table 4. Marginal Effects of Protest Participation Decisions (Sep99-Jan00) 
Dependant Variable:  LOCAL PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT
Age -0.0018447***  -0.0006829  -0.0033377*** 
Married -0.0077699  -0.0456299*  -0.035926** 
North-Western 0.2002495***  0.0627182**  -0.0100697 
Central 0.2443966***  0.0759936***  -0.0172481 
Volga 0.0218448  0.0074176  -0.0481866* 
Black Earth  0.27046***  0.0769527**  0.0126227 
Povolzhskiy 0.0873528***  0.0715351**  0.0069953 
North Caucasus  0.140773***  0.0602187**  0.0362908 
Ural 0.2093777***  0.0850504***  0.0134622 
West Siberia  0.0840042***  0.1187945***  0.0479219 
East Siberia  0.1817471***  0.1705126***  0.0418214 
Far East  0.2253818***  0.0897273**  0.0585288* 
Voted Yeltsin  -0.0508213***  -0.2146185***  -0.0988628*** 
Public Sector  -0.0002693  0.0293346  0.030284* 
Male 0.0229733**  0.0095956  0.0089649 
Years of Schooling  -0.0097642***  -0.0069322**  -0.0112326*** 
Managerial Job  -0.0075924  -0.0646452***  -0.0590877*** 
Arrears 0.0302931*  0.0790676***  0.0318364* 
Expected Inflation  0.0545896***  0.0905081***  0.0595865*** 
Dependent Ratio  -0.0203362  -0.0501194*  -0.0643779** 
Improved Status  -0.0157257  -0.0994842***  -0.1048619*** 




  This preliminary analysis suggests that the Russian financial crisis of 1998 
imposed a further increase in inequality and poverty on to a process which had already 
(Brainerd, 1998) taken Russia from one of the most equal societies in the world to one 
whose levels of inequity surpass those of the United States. There was a slight reversion 
to lower levels of inequity and poverty after the peak of the crisis in September 1998, 
but not going back as far as pre-crisis levels. 
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  We then examined the determinants of political protest in the period during and 
immediately following the crisis. We found that, in general, those most likely to protest 
are those who have least to lose – those who are unmarried and without managerial jobs 
and with relatively low economic status. However,  past bitter experience of wage 
arrears and expectations of future crisis predispose towards protest. Finally, remoteness 
from Moscow  - in Siberia, the Far East,  and the North Caucasus – also is associated 
with a propensity towards protest. (Can this be related to later separatist movements? – 
see Giuliano, 2006) 
  Subsequent drafts of this paper will seek to explore the correlation of protest 
with poverty, unemployment and ill-health themselves,  to embed the analysis within a 
framework of simultaneous causation, and to link the participation in political protest 
analysed here with political developments in Russia subsequent to 2000.  
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Appendix. OLS Estimated Earning Equations 
Period: Jan98-May98  Sep98-May99  Sep99-Jan00 
Dependant Variable:          
Age -0.0273073  0.0346397  0.0456504 
Age
2 0.0003534 -0.0004802  -0.0005636 
Married -0.1360672  0.0927674  0.0783486 
North-Western -0.5722448***  -0.3983671***  -0.2130264 
Central -0.6442835***  -0.8452298***  -0.3114399** 
Volga -0.7800852***  -0.7465859***  -0.4112161** 
Black Earth  -0.9095893***  -0.9761594***  -0.9204116*** 
Povolzhskiy -0.6549957***  -0.8849477***  -0.6362255*** 
North Caucasus  -0.4647329***  -1.195144***  -0.6686659*** 
Ural -0.8119889***  -1.063455***  -0.671162*** 
West Siberia  -0.5014036***  -0.7566903***  -0.4977792*** 
East Siberia  -0.7812843***  -1.063861***  -0.4387063** 
Far East  -0.5826589***  -0.4339978***  -0.5566319*** 
Sector Public  -0.5113453***  -0.7880301***  -0.3778866*** 
Male 0.2924866***  0.2130652***  0.2850263*** 
Manager 0.6176561***  0.2873205**  0.6966692*** 
Specialist 0.1188922  0.1503279*  0.1466798 
Years of Schooling  0.0649929***  0.048197***  0.0797769*** 
Constant 6.463872***  5.7154  4.915226 
R
2 0.103 0.097  0.082 
N  1833 3039  1869 
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